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"Insanity is a more difficult matter to deal with ... ,
I. INTRODUCTION
ORT liability is imposed on mentally disordered defendants as if they
had no such disorder. If, for example, a person with a diagnosable
disorder of paranoid schizophrenia 2 strikes another because of a delu-
© Grant H. Morris, 1994.
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; Clinical Professor, Depart-
ment of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of California, San Diego. The author ex-
presses sincere appreciation to Professor Daniel Shuman for reviewing an earlier draft of this
article and providing helpful comments as well as clarification of his proposal.
1. 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 109 (1881).
2. Schizophrenia is a common, major mental disorder. According to the American Psy-
chiatric Association, many large studies have reported a prevalence rate of 0.2% to 2.0%.
Typically, the prevalence rate is reported to be between 0.5% and 1.0%. AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV)
282 (4th ed. 1994). According to the 1990 census, the total population in the United States is
248,709,873. 1993 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 387 (Mark S. Hoffman ed.,
125th ed. 1992). A 1% prevalence rate for schizophrenia would be approximately 2,500,000
people.
Paranoid schizophrenia is a type of schizophrenia characterized by "the presence of promi-
1837
SMU LAW REVIEW
sional belief that the other is about to attack, the mentally disordered person
will be held liable for the tort of battery.3 The court asks only whether the
defendant acted with the purpose of making a harmful or offensive contact
or with knowledge that such contact was substantially certain to result. The
defendant's delusional belief that prompted the tortious action does not ex-
cuse tort liability. In essence, the defendant's misinterpretation of reality is
treated as a nonexculpating mistake.
In a conventional mistake case, the defendant engages in conduct that
injures the plaintiff, and the defendant intends to engage in that conduct and
to produce that injury at the time the defendant acts. The defendant claims,
however, to have acted under an erroneous, but reasonable, belief that cir-
cumstances existed justifying the defendant's behavior. In the absence of
any other privilege, a good faith, reasonable mistake will not excuse tort
liability. 4 Similarly, if a mentally disordered defendant acts with the intent
required to impose tort liability on a nonmentally disordered defendant, the
mentally disordered person's good faith, but unreasonable, mistake will not
preclude tort liability. 5
Liability of mentally disordered persons is not limited to intentional torts.
If, for example, a mentally disordered motorist fails to control his or her car
because of a delusional belief that God is directing the vehicle, the motorist
will be held liable in negligence for damages that result.6 The court asks
only whether the defendant's conduct conformed to the standard of the rea-
sonable, prudent person engaged in that activity-an objective standard that
measures negligence for both mentally disordered and nonmentally disor-
nent delusions or auditory hallucinations in the context of a relative preservation of cognitive
functioning and affect." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra at 287.
3. See, e.g., McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937). The defendant, characterized
by the court as an insane person, struck the plaintiff, her nurse, with a piece of furniture. The
jury found that the defendant acted with an intent to strike and injure the plaintiff. The de-
fendant was held liable. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts summarized the rule as
follows:
[W]here an insane person by his act does intentional damage to the person or
property of another he is liable for that damage in the same circumstances in
which a normal person would be liable. This means that insofar as a particular
intent would be necessary in order to render a normal person liable, the insane
person, in order to be liable, must have been capable of entertaining that same
intent and must have entertained it in fact. But the law will not inquire further
into his peculiar mental condition with a view to excusing him if it should ap-
pear that delusion or other consequence of his affliction has caused him to enter-
tain that intent or that a normal person would not have entertained it.
Id. at 763.
4. See, e.g., Ranson v. Kitner, 31 111. App. 241 (1888). The defendants, hunting for
wolves, killed the plaintiff's dog believing it to be a wolf. They were held liable for the value of
the dog, notwithstanding their good faith mistake.
5. If a tort requires a specific intent, however, a mentally disordered defendant who acts
without such intent has not committed the tort and should not be, but sometimes has been,
held liable. Deceit and malicious prosecution are examples of specific intent torts. W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 135, at 1074 (5th ed.
1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895J cmt. c (1979). Similarly, punitive
damages should not be imposed on a mentally disordered defendant whose intentional tortious
conduct was not accompanied by the malicious motive or outrageousness required to justify its
imposition. KEETON, supra at 1074.
6. Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970).
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dered defendants.7
Throughout the twentieth century, law review commentators have over-
whelmingly,8 although not quite unanimously, 9 criticized the courts' refusal
to consider a defendant's mental disorder in assessing tort liability. The arti-
cles are remarkably alike. A typical article begins by tracing the principle to
Weaver v. Ward. 10 In this 1616 King's Bench decision, the court stated in its
dictum 1 that "if a lunatic hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass
.... "12 The statement was not remarkable because, at the time, strict liabil-
ity was imposed on all defendants who caused harm. The court used the
lunatic example merely to distinguish tort law from criminal law which ex-
cuses mentally disordered defendants if they lack mens rea.
With the development of fault-based liability and societal acceptance of a
medical model to explain mental disorder, 13 one would suspect that
7. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961) (The defendant, a
patient being treated for chronic paranoid schizophrenia, left the hospital, drove a car, and
collided with the plaintiff's car. The defendant was held liable for negligent operation of the
automobile.); Shapiro v. Tchernowitz, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (In dis-
charging bullets from his gun, the defendant shot and killed the plaintiff's husband. In a
wrongful death action, the defendant was held liable for negligence.); Ellis v. Fixico, 50 P.2d
162, 164 (Okla. 1935) (The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a mentally disordered person,
negligently allowed her car to be driven in a reckless manner by her driver, resulting in a
collision and injuries to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a demurrer to
the petition should not have been sustained. The court relied on a statute holding a person of
unsound mind civilly liable for a wrong "in like manner as any other person."). See infra note
23 for cases decided since 1965.
8. Articles criticizing the imposition of fault-based tort liability on mentally disordered
defendants include: Robert M. Ague, Jr., The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60
DICK. L. REV. 211 (1956); Frances H. Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons,
23 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1924); W.G.H. Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort, 21 COLUM.
L. REV. 333 (1921); William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Defi-
cient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52 (1960); James W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled
Persons, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1079; Win. B. Hornblower, Insanity and the Law of
Negligence, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 278 (1905); David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and
Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally
Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17 (1981); Wm. Justus Wilkinson, Mental Incompetency
as a Defense to Tort Liability, 17 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 38 (1944).
9. Two articles defend the imposition of fault-based tort liability on mentally disordered
defendants. See George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil
Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 24 (1967); Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the
Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153 (1983).
10. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
11. In Weaver, the plaintiff and the defendant were trained soldiers engaged in a military
exercise. In discharging his musket, the defendant wounded the plaintiff. The defendant was
held liable because the injury did not occur "utterly without his fault." Id. The defendant did
not claim that he suffered from a mental disorder that should excuse his conduct.
12. Id.
13. Justice Michael Musmanno reported on the changing societal attitude toward mental
disorder:
Today modem science and society take a view of mental trouble quite different
from that which prevailed down through the ages. In the ancient days victims
of cerebral disorders were regarded as subhuman; they were assumed to be pos-
sessed of the devil and devoid of spirit, feeling, and the sensibilities of man; they
were ostracized from community life. But time has opened the eyes of the sensi-
ble world and it is now recognized that a malady of the brain, so far as spirit and
morals are concerned, is no different from a disease of the liver ....
Commonwealth ex rel. Edinger v. Edinger, 98 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. 1953).
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Weaver's "lunatic" dictum would be long forgotten. One's suspicions would
be incorrect. Weaver has endured due to the court's recognition, also in
dictum, that a defendant will not be liable for a purely accidental injury.
Weaver is the earliest known case to suggest this limitation on strict
liability. 14
Commentators usually note that appellate cases upholding tort liability of
mentally disordered defendants are few in number and infrequent in occur-
rence-especially cases involving negligence. For example, Cook,15 writing
in 1921, and Bohlen, 16 writing in 1924, could find only one case 17 holding a
mentally disordered defendant liable for negligence. Curran,' 8 writing in
1960, could find only one additional case-and that case was a trial court
decision in the same jurisdiction as the first. 19
This scant authority, however, influenced the American Law Institute in
its Restatement of Torts. The first Restatement, published in 1934, con-
tained a caveat in which the Institute expressed no opinion on whether men-
tally disordered persons are required to conform to the reasonable person
standard.20 The caveat was deleted in the 1948 supplement. 21 The second
Restatement, published in 1965, specifically identified mentally disordered
14. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 6 (8th ed. 1988).
15. Cook, supra note 8, at 349.
16. Bohlen, supra note 8, at 23.
17. Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1894), subsequent appeal, 52 N.E. 589 (N.Y.
1899). A ship captain was in a state of exhaustion after working 48 hours to save the ship from
a storm. In a dazed condition, he declined the assistance of tugboats offering to tow the dis-
abled vessel. The ship was destroyed. Although the issues in the two appeals differed, in each
the New York Court of Appeals recognized that mental disorder was not a defense to a claim
of negligence. The New York Court of Appeals decisions in Williams are discussed at length
in Bohlen, supra note 8, at 23-27. Williams is considered the leading American case holding
that negligence liability of the mentally disordered is measured by the objective, reasonable
person standard. Ague, supra note 8, at 215. The case was even cited as authority in the
totally unrelated Palsgraf case. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting).
18. Curran, supra note 8, at 61.
19. Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 268 N.Y.S. 446, 448 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1934).
(The defendant bus driver suddenly became insane, lost control of the bus, and collided with
the plaintiff's parked truck. The defendant was held liable for negligence.).
20. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 283 (1934). The first Restatement's position is supported
by Hornblower. Writing in 1905, Hornblower asserted that despite the New York Court of
Appeals's decisions in Williams, the liability of a mentally disordered defendant for negligence
remained an open question even in New York state. Hornblower, supra note 8, at 297. Other
noted authorities predicted that courts would not impose tort liability on mentally disordered
defendants. Ames, writing in 1908, prophesied that American courts "will sooner or later
apply to the lunatic the ethical principle of no liability without fault." James Barr Ames, Law
and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 100 (1908). Bohlen, writing in 1924, asserted that the
decisions and opinions he discussed in his article "seem logically to imply that insanity is a bar
to recovery." Bohlen, supra note 8, at 28. Dean Bohlen served as the Reporter for the first
Restatement of Torts.
21. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 283 (Supp. 1948). The American Law Institute first
considered the question of tort liability of mentally disordered persons at its 1929 annual meet-
ing. The caveat was added at that time. Its deletion in 1948 can hardly be attributed to the
one reported case decided between 1929 and 1948 imposing negligence liability on a mentally
disordered defendant. Rather, the American Law Institute relied on opinions from several
intentional tort cases that contained language broad enough to impose negligence liability in
future cases. Id. at 654-58. "Once it is clearly seen that the insane person who intentionally
injures another is subjected to tort liability despite his moral innocence ... then these decisions
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defendants as individuals who are subject to liability for conduct that does
not conform to the reasonable person standard. 22 The American Law Insti-
tute's capitulation provided new authority to help settle a questionable
rule.23 Nevertheless, the continued dearth of negligence cases supporting
the rule and the continued academic onslaught challenging the rule suggest
that its future is uncertain. 24
Commentators invariably list the courts' stated reasons for imposing the
reasonable person test on the mentally disordered. 25 But the reasons are
often presented as straw men who are unable to bear the weight of even the
become controlling authority for imposing liability for the same harm, unintentionally caused
by one who is personally neither more nor less blameworthy." Id. at 658.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965); see also id. § 895J (1979) (stating
that mentally disordered persons are not immune from tort liability solely because of their
disorder).
23. Since 1965, five cases have followed § 283B by imposing negligence liability on men-
tally disordered defendants for conduct that did not conform to the reasonable person stan-
dard. Turner v. Caldwell, 421 A.2d 876, 876 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980) (The defendant's claim
that she was suddenly stricken by mental illness rendering her unable to control her vehicle
was not a defense to an action grounded in negligence.); Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647, 649
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 309 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1975) (The defendant shot and killed
the deceased but was acquitted of homicide by reason of insanity. In a wrongful death claim,
the court construed the defendant's action as unintentional. The court held: "[W]hen the
predicate for a wrongful death action is unintentional tort the standard against which such tort
is measured is the objective, 'reasonable man standard' and the subjective state of mind of the
tortfeasor is irrelevant."); Kuhn v. Zabotsky, 224 N.E.2d 137, 141 (Ohio 1967) (The defend-
ant, claiming to have been suddenly stricken by a mental illness, drove his car into the rear of
the plaintiffs car, inflicting personal injury and property damage. The court held the defend-
ant liable for negligence.); Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 300 (Or. 1979) (An attorney
who suffered from a psychotic disorder was held liable for professional negligence. The court
specifically accepted the rule stated in § 283B.); Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 173
N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970) (The court upheld a jury verdict against a mentally disordered
defendant whose delusion affected her ability to operate her vehicle as a reasonable, prudent
driver. In this case, evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find that the defendant could
anticipate the occurrence of incapacitating delusions. The court ruled, however, that if a situa-
tion arises in which the defendant is suddenly overcome without forewarning by a disabling
mental disorder, liability will not be imposed.).
One post-1965 case specifically rejected the position that a mentally disordered person is
liable for negligence. Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 294 A.2d 338 (Conn. C.P. 1972) (The defendant
shot and wounded the plaintiff. The trial court judge found no intent to injure and treated the
plaintiff's suit as a claim of negligence. The judge found for the defendant, characterizing the
rule imposing tort liability on the mentally disordered as "an outdated point of view." Id. at
339. However, in apparent confusion, the court asserted: "The standard of conduct de-
manded of an insane person should not be any greater than the standard of conduct which it is
reasonable for one to expect of a sane person. A sane individual is only required to exercise the
standard of conduct which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same cir-
cumstances." Id.).
24. KEETON, supra note 5, at 1075 ("[T]he permanent direction of the law may be in
doubt even now.").
25. The commentators' lists vary in number from three to six. Bohlen, for example, iden-
tifies three reasons for the rule: (1) the Weaver dictum, (2) a reappearance of liability without
fault, and (3) liability for failure to perform a duty imposed on owners or occupiers of land or
on persons engaged in certain trades. Bohlen, supra note 8, at 12. Ellis's list of six is the most
comprehensive, although it includes reasons suggested by section 283B of the Restatement
Second of Torts and by Prosser, as well as reasons articulated in court opinions. Ellis identifies
the following reasons:
1) "[W]here one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be borne
by the one who occasioned it."
2) Liability for negligent acts will encourage those who are responsible for men-
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most perfunctory analysis. To the claim that the rule is necessary to assure
that innocent plaintiffs receive compensation from those who injure them,
the answer has been that liability in negligence is not liability without fault.
26
For torts in which fault is a prerequisite to liability for nonmentally disor-
dered persons, nothing less should be required for liability of the mentally
disordered. To the contention that all people living in society, including
mentally disordered people, should be held responsible for their torts, the
refutation has been that tort liability is dependent upon a finding of tortious
behavior. The question of whether a mentally disordered defendant has
committed a tort cannot be answered by saying he or she is liable for all torts
that he or she commits. 27 To the assertion that imposing liability on men-
tally disordered persons encourages guardians to control their activities or to
obtain their involuntary confinement, the response has been that guardians
who inadequately supervise persons under their authority are liable for their
own negligence, and thus it is unnecessary to impose tort liability on the
mentally disordered persons as well. 28 To the argument that mental disor-
der is easily feigned, and that the rule is needed to prevent nonmentally dis-
ordered defendants from succeeding with false claims, the rebuttal has been
that the stigma and social consequences that accompany the label of mental
tally disabled persons (their families or guardians) to look after them and pre-
vent them from doing harm.
3) If mentally disabled people are to live in liberty in society, they should pay
for the damage they cause.
4) Mental disability is easily feigned, and defendants might choose such an act
of duplicity to avoid liability.
5) It is difficult for courts to distinguish between "true" mental disability and
variations in temperament, intellect, and emotional balance, and to allow all
such differences to serve as excuses would erode the objective standard in all
cases.
6) The insanity defense and the doctrine of diminished capacity have wreaked
havoc in the field of criminal law, and this chaos should not be recreated in tort
law.
Ellis, supra note 8, at 1083-84 (footnotes omitted).
26. Ague stated that this reason "is nothing more than strict (or absolute) liability dressed
up in Sunday-go-to-meetin' garb. In the case of the lunatic let's not drift back into that un-
moral abyss once again!" Ague, supra note 8, at 222. Seidelson noted that negligence law
generally does not shift the loss from an innocent victim to a nonculpable, innocent actor.
Seidelson, supra note 8, at 38.
27. The Second Restatement of Torts clearly separates the standard used to measure
whether a mentally disordered person's conduct is negligent from the question of whether
mental disorder immunizes a person from liability for conduct that is tortious. Compare RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965) with § 895J (1979).
28. CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 50-51 (2d ed.
1980); Alexander & Szasz, supra note 9, at 35-36. Seidelson declared this reason to be "hardly
more than a cynical fabrication to support a rule of law almost facially unfathomable." Seidel-
son, supra note 8, at 38.
Today, as a result of deinstitutionalization of mental patient populations from large state
hospitals, most mentally disordered people live in the community. If they receive treatment
for their disorders, treatment occurs in community programs. Even involuntary commitment
is typically of short duration and occurs in local facilities. A policy that encourages guardians
to seek involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons in order to avoid tort liability




disorder are a sufficient deterrent to its unwarranted use.29 To the challenge
that the objective standard would be jeopardized by attempts to distinguish
mental disorder from nonqualifying peculiarities of temperament and char-
acter, the defense has been that abdication of judicial responsibility cannot
be countenanced by a preference for easy resolution over proper resolution. 30
Admittedly, requiring an assessment of mental disorder increases the diffi-
culty of decision making. 3 1 Nevertheless, confronting this difficulty is pref-
erable to blindly imposing tort liability on mentally disordered persons who
committed no torts.3 2 The objective standard of care has already been aban-
doned for children, 33 when they are engaged in childhood activities, and for
physically disabled individuals.3 4 If fairness requires its abandonment for
the mentally disordered, justice should not be thwarted by appeals to
expediency. 35
29. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 8, at 1087 (The label of mental illness carries a substantial
stigma in our society. Although mentally incompetent people may escape contract obligations,
false claims of mental incapacity are rare.); Seidelson, supra note 8, at 39 (Anyone willing to
risk an adjudication of mental incompetence "in exchange for the possible evasion of liability
in negligence would have to be crazy."). Seidelson also asserted that judges and juries are as
competent to distinguish between a real and spurious defense of mental disorder as they are
other defenses. Id. at 38.
Diagnostic agreement among psychiatrists and other mental health professionals has im-
proved significantly with the use of specified criteria for each mental disorder contained in
succeeding editions of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual (DSM). DSM-III, published in 1980, was a marked improvement over previous editions,
resulting in greater diagnostic inter-rater reliability. DSM-III-R was published in 1987 and
DSM-IV was published in 1994. With each revision of the DSM, diagnosis tends to become
more accurate and detection of false claims of mental disorder improves. See Ellis, supra note
8, at 1086-87.
30. Seidelson, supra note 8, at 40.
31. Prosser has often been credited with suggesting that courts have been reluctant to
introduce into tort cases "the confusion and unsatisfactory tests attending proof of insanity in
criminal cases." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1090 (1941).
Succeeding editions of the Prosser treatise contain the same statement. See, e.g., KEETON,
supra note 5, at 1073. Prosser, however, cites Bohlen's 1924 law review article as the source of
the idea. Bohlen, supra note 8, at 36 n.38. Although Bohlen presents the idea, he rejects it on
the merits, declaring:
[I]t seems unworthy of the law, whose purpose it should be to do justice and to
perfect its machinery so that justice may be done, to deny immunity to persons
so insane as to be incapable of culpability because of the difficulty of evolving a
test satisfactory alike to lawyer and alienist (i.e., psychiatrist] by which the pre-
cise degree of mental deficiency which precludes culpability may be determined.
Id.
32. Ague, supra note 8, at 224 ("[N]o rule governing [mental disorder] will be infallible;
but certainly an imperfect rule is better than no rule at all in such a case .... Just because the
criminal law rules on insanity fall far short of perfection is no reason why we should throw up
our hands and say the same thing will happen in the tort field."); Seidelson, supra note 8, at 40("[Tihe judicial refusal to define the 'insanity defense' [in tort cases] appears inconsistent with
the conduct of courts in criminal cases and unjustified by the difficulty of the task.").
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965). The objective standard, how-
ever, is applied to children engaged in dangerous activities that require adult qualifications. Id.
cmt. c. The objective standard is applied, not to encourage children to exercise greater care
when engaging in adult activities, but rather, to discourage them from engaging in adult activi-
ties in the first place.
34. Id. § 283C.
35. In other civil and criminal contexts, a person's mental disorder is considered in arriv-
ing at a just result. In the civil context, examples include guardianship, civil commitment, and
1994] 1843
SMU LAW REVIEW
After rejecting the various reasons for the rule, commentators complete
their typical articles by offering one of two solutions. Some commentators,
especially those writing before 1960, would absolve mentally disordered per-
sons from fault-based tort liability. 36 These writers narrowly define "men-
tally disordered persons" to include only those individuals who lack the
capacity to appreciate the possible consequences of their behavior. 37 Be-
cause these individuals are unable to conform to the reasonable person stan-
dard, injuries caused by their conduct should be considered the result of
unavoidable accidents. 38 Motorists who are suddenly and unexpectedly
overcome with heart attacks, strokes, or fainting spells are not held liable for
resulting injuries; 39 mentally disordered persons who are unable to control
their conduct should be absolved as well.
Other commentators, especially those writing in the early 1980s, would
measure fault-based tort liability of mentally disordered persons using a sub-
jective standard of care. 4° Even these writers narrowly define "mentally dis-
ordered persons" to include only those individuals who are factually
incapable of achieving the level of conduct required of the objective reason-
able person.41 Just as the law does not require the blind person to see, the
testamentary capacity; in the criminal context, examples include the insanity defense and di-
minished capacity. No overwhelming difficulty has been encountered in considering mental
disorder in those contexts. No overwhelming difficulty is likely to be encountered if mental
disorder is considered in determining tort liability. Ellis, supra note 8, at 1089-90.
36. See, e.g., Ague, supra note 8, at 227 ("Can lunatics be said to be at fault simply be-
cause they are lunatics and 'know not what they do?' The question would seem to answer
itself without further recourse to the scriptures."); Bohlen, supra note 8, at 28 ("[W]here the
incapacity is mental, the same mental deficiency which prevents him from performing the
duties normally incident to the relation or of conducting himself properly in the activity which
he undertakes, would equally preclude his capacity for fault in entering the relation or under-
taking the activity."); Cook, supra note 8, at 344 ("[W]here a lunatic is incapable of knowing
what he is doing, i.e., where he is not a responsible being at all, he would appear not to be
liable: the result in such a case being that the person damaged through the act or omission of
the lunatic would be in a position analogous to that of a person who has suffered damage
through inevitable accident .... "); Hornblower, supra note 8, at 293 ("That a man should be
responsible in damages for failing to do what he was physically or mentally unable to do, is
certainly shocking to the common-sense of the average individual."); Wilkinson, supra note 8,
at 57 ("If fault is the crux of negligence it is, indeed, hard to make a logical case for holding a
mentally incompetent person liable for negligence, for where can fault be found?").
37. See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 8, at 9 ("Insane persons" defined as "incapable of forming
a culpable intention, or whose incapacity to realize the probable consequences of their conduct
makes it unjust to require them to conform to the standards of conduct legally required of...
mentally normal persons."); Hornblower, supra note 8, at 283 ("When we come, however, to
the question of a person non compos mentis, we have a situation of absolute mental incapacity
. . . . .).
38. In an unavoidable accident, even though the defendant's conduct injured the plaintiff,
the result was not intended by the defendant, and the defendant was not negligent. The de-
fendant is not liable. KEETON, supra note 5, at 162.
39. Id.
40. Ellis, supra note 8, at 1109 ("Adoption of a subjective standard ... may be seen as a
modest step toward equitable treatment of the mentally handicapped before the law."); Seidel-
son, supra note 8, at 44 ("Is it justifiable to frustrate legally a claimant's reasonable expecta-
tions by giving the benefit of a subjective standard to an incompetent who is the only
potentially viable defendant? I think the answer is yes.").
41. Ellis, supra note 8, at 1108 ("[The subjective standard] does not immunize mentally
disabled people from responsibility for their torts, but it does provide them with a defense
when they can show that they did their best to avoid the accident and that further preventive
1844 [Vol. 47
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deaf person to hear, or the young child to act with the maturity and wisdom
of an adult, a similar allowance should be made for those mentally disor-
dered defendants who are incapable of conforming to the objective reason-
able person standard. 42
Recently, however, a new perspective has been introduced to the standard
of care controversy. Daniel Shuman, filtering his ideas through the prism of
therapeutic jurisprudence, has proposed expanding the subjective standard
to include persons who have initiated treatment for their mental disorder or
for the transient situational stress they are experiencing. 4 3 Shuman's propo-
sal is original and provocative. Upon reflection, however, I believe that it is
flawed and should be rejected. In Part II, I analyze Shuman's proposal. 44
In Part III, I suggest an alternative solution that I believe is preferable.
II. EXPANDING THE SUBJECTIVE STANDARD: A CRITIQUE
A. THE PROPOSAL
In a seminal book published in 1990, .David Wexler used the term "thera-
peutic jurisprudence" to describe the study of law as a therapeutic agent.45
Without subordinating other competing values, the therapeutic jurispru-
dence perspective seeks to enlighten legal decision making in order to en-
hance therapeutic consequences and diminish antitherapeutic
consequences.
46
Shuman asserts that in their desire to deter injury-producing conduct,
fault-based tort law and therapeutic jurisprudence share a common
agenda.47 Tort law's therapeutic potential is advanced by encouraging indi-
viduals with mental or emotional problems to undergo effective treatment to
ameliorate their conditions and reduce their accident-producing potential.48
measures were beyond their ability."); Seidelson, supra note 8, at 45 ("Under our definition of
mental incompetence, the actor suffering from this infirmity cannot possibly act consistently
with the reasonable person standard.").
42. For a comprehensive discussion analogizing mentally disordered persons to physically
disabled persons and children, see Ellis, supra note 8, at 1098-106. Ellis asserts that although
these analogies are "helpful tools," id. at 1106, "neither is perfectly apt." Id. at 1098. He
concludes, nevertheless, that mentally disordered defendants should not be "held to a standard
that they are definitionally incapable of meeting." Id. at 1108.
43. Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: A Limited Subjective
Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REV. 409, 426 (1992).
44. Perhaps "reanalyze" is a more apt word choice. At Professor Shuman's request, I
previously critiqued his article while it was in draft stage. In the published article, he gra-
ciously acknowledged my "helpful comments" to that draft. Id. at 409; see also, id. at 428
n.95.
45. DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT (1990). A companion volume was published a year later. DAVID B. WEXLER &
BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
46. WEXLER, supra note 45, at 3-20; WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 45, at x-xii, 17-38.
Therapeutic jurisprudence principles have strongly influenced recent mental health law schol-
arship. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 17 (1993) (discussing sources).
47. Shuman, supra note 43, at 410. Shuman expresses doubt, however, that tort law is
capable of deterring injury-producing conduct. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
48. Shuman, supra note 43, at 411-12.
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By threatening tort liability for unreasonable behavior, the objective reason-
able person standard induces those in need of treatment to obtain it.49 Thus,
Shuman would continue to use that standard for those defendants who did
not seek treatment prior to the injury-producing conduct. However, for
those defendants who initiated treatment for their mental or emotional prob-
lem prior to the injury-producing conduct, Shuman proposes using a subjec-
tive standard of care that assesses the defendant's conduct in light of the
treatment received.5 o Although use of a subjective standard will not always
result in a lowered expectation for the defendant's behavior, 51 in some situa-
tions it will. For example, some therapies that are effective in the long term
may actually increase the short term risk of accidental injury.5 2 In deter-
mining whether a person under treatment performed as well as society could
reasonably expect, society should be willing to consider the person's willing-
ness to undergo treatment and the effects of that treatment on the person.5 3
To maximize the therapeutic potential of tort law, Shuman would not limit
his proposal to individuals suffering from major mental illnesses. Rather, he
would also include the "walking wounded" 5 4-identified as individuals
whose life changes have produced transient situational stress. 55
B. THE PROPOSAL UNDERVALUES THE COMPENSATION OBJECTIVE
In the first paragraph of his article, Shuman admits that therapeutic juris-
prudence encourages a therapeutic outcome "when it is possible to do so
without offending other important normative values."'5 6 Shuman acknowl-
edges that tort law has two objectives: deterrence of potential injurers from
engaging in unsafe conduct and compensation of injured victims. 5 7 But Shu-
man fails to consider the importance of the compensation goal to present-
day tort law. Nineteenth century barriers to a plaintiff's tort recovery have
been demolished by the actions of twentieth century courts:58 A privity re-
quirement for recovery against manufacturers of defective products has been
49. Id. at 424.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 428.
52. Id. at 423.
53. Id. at 428.
54. Id. at 414. Shuman notes that the "walking wounded" have been denominated by
others as the "worried well." Id. n.36 (citing sources).
55. Id. at 416.
56. Id. at 409. Even Wexler, the father of therapeutic jurisprudence, admits that thera-
peutic considerations should not trump other, more important, normative values. See, e.g.,
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 279, 280 (1993); David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 517, 518 (1992). Therapeutic jurisprudence would restructure
the law to better accomplish therapeutic goals only if, in a given context, other things (i.e.,
normative values) were equal. Therapeutic jurisprudence does not resolve the question of
whether those other things are equal. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal
Courts, supra at 280; WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 45, at xi-xii.
57. Shuman, supra note 43, at 410.




abandoned; 59 charitable, 6° intra-family, 61 and governmental62 immunities
have been eliminated in whole or in part; a rule imposing no duty to avoid
prenatal injuries has been renounced;63 an impact requirement to recover for
negligently inflicted mental injury has been repudiated;64 rigid classification
of trespassers and licensees to reduce or eliminate the duty owed by land
occupiers has been rejected; 65 the doctrine of contributory negligence has
been replaced with comparative negligence rules. 66 The goal of compensa-
tion also has been strengthened by the courts' acceptance of loss distribution
principles. 67 In some areas, notably employee injuries,68 minor automobile
accidents, 69 and defective products, 70 fault-based liability has been sup-
planted by liability without fault, thus enabling injured plaintiffs to obtain
compensation without even proving that defendants were blameworthy
wrongdoers in need of deterrence. 71
In determining whether a defendant's negligence should be measured by
59. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
60. See, e.g., President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
61. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889, 891 (Conn. 1914) (abrogating intraspousal im-
munity); Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963) (abrogating parent-child
immunity).
62. See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107, 109 (Ariz. 1963) (abro-
gating the immunity of the state government); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d
130, 133 (Fla. 1957) (abrogating the immunity of municipal corporations).
63. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (recovery allowed to
viable fetus who was born alive); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982) ("wrongful
life" recovery permitted for the cost of extraordinary medical expenses incurred due to infant
plaintiff's handicaps); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Minn. 1949) (upheld claim
for wrongful death of viable fetus).
64. See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. 1961).
65. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).
66. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532
P.2d 1226, 1232 (Cal. 1975).
67. See Ursin, supra note 58, at 301-03.
68. N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW §§ I to 49-hh (McKinney 1993). In 1910, New York was
the first state to enact a Workers' Compensation Law. 1910 N.Y. Laws 674 (designated as
Article 14-A of the N.Y. Labor Law of 1909). One year later, the statute was declared uncon-
stitutional. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431, 448 (N.Y. 1911). The New York legisla-
ture amended the state constitution to provide for a system of workers' compensation, N.Y.
CONST. art. 1, § 18, and reenacted the Workers' Compensation Law in 1914. 1914 N.Y. Laws
ch. 41. The reenacted law was held constitutional. Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 N.E. 600,
604 (N.Y. 1915). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.01-.89 (West Supp. 1993). Wisconsin was
the second state to enact a Workers' Compensation Law. In 1911, the law, as originally en-
acted, was held constitutional. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 222 (Wis. 1911).
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34M (West Supp. 1993). Massachusetts' no fault
automobile statute, the nation's first, was held constitutional in Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d
592, 611 (Mass. 1971).
70. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). Strict liabil-
ity for manufacturing defects seems firmly established. However, definitional difficulties have
been encountered in design defect and product warning cases. For those cases, recent propos-
als seek restoration of negligence as the basis of liability. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, 2 REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 16, 39, 81-
82 (1991).
71. It should be noted, however, that tort liability accounts for only a small portion of the
compensation received for injuries. A recent RAND study found that liability compensation is
attempted for only one injury in ten. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1991).
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an objective or a subjective test, the compensation goal cannot be ignored. If
a subjective standard of care is employed for persons with mental and emo-
tional problems who are undergoing treatment, then injured innocent vic-
tims will be forced to absorb the costs of injuries produced by the increased
risk of substandard behavior posed by those defendants. Such a result is
antithetical to the compensation objective and to the twentieth century tort
law developments that support this objective.72
Shuman concedes that his proposal, while encouraging treatment, denies
compensation to innocent plaintiffs. He notes, however, that compensation
is "a relativist rather than an absolute concern of tort law."'73 Fault-based
tort law does not award compensation to an injured plaintiff unless the de-
fendant has been found blameworthy. Thus, when a plaintiff is injured by a
physically incapacitated defendant whose conduct is measured by a subjec-
tive standard that includes this incapacitation, the injured plaintiff may re-
ceive no compensation. 74
Shuman's analogy is not convincing. Admittedly, a subjective standard is
used to measure the conduct of a person who is blind, deaf, or otherwise
seriously physically challenged. 75 To the extent possible, the law requires
physically challenged individuals to undertake appropriate precautions in
order to reduce the increased risk from their disability. For example, a blind
person venturing out on the city streets may be expected to use a white cane
or a seeing-eye dog. Nevertheless, even with this precaution, the blind per-
son is simply unable to achieve the level of safety of a person with sight.
Because the condition of blindness can be proven easily and because we are
all aware of the effect of that condition on the person's ability to anticipate
harm, society is willing to tolerate the increased risk by holding the blind
person to the standard of the reasonable blind person. 76
Although the subjective standard is applied both to physically challenged
plaintiffs and defendants, in most cases involving physically challenged per-
sons, the plaintiff was the physically challenged litigant.77 The subjective
standard may have been accepted originally by courts eager to avoid the
harsh contributory negligence doctrine and accord physically challenged
72. See, e.g., Goff v. Taylor, 708 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986):
That the subjective standard would afford fairer treatment of a defendant af-
flicted with a mental disability cannot be disputed. The question the commenta-
tors do not attempt to reach is the fairness to the victim of the wrongful
conduct. Is a victim any less entitled to compensation for his loss because of the
mental deficiencies of his tortfeasor? We believe the answer is no and the tort
law as it stands has long served to accommodate that principle.
73. Shuman, supra note 43, at 431.
74. Id.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965).
76. The Restatement commentary suggests that a subjective standard is used for physical
disability but not for mental disability because of "the greater public familiarity with the for-
mer, and the comparative ease and certainty with which it can be proved." Id. cmt. b.
77. Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo.
L. REV. 1, 21 (1951). Similarly, in most cases using a relaxed standard of care for children, the
plaintiff was the child. Id. at 24.
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plaintiffs an opportunity for recovery. 78
Typically, however, the standard of care is not subjectified for a person
who has a physical illness.79 If, for example, I am suffering from influenza
and drive my car, I am not held to the standard of the reasonable person
with influenza. Even if I obtain treatment for my condition, for example, I
ingest a medicine that causes drowsiness, and I fall asleep while driving, I
am still held to the objective standard of the reasonable, prudent driver.
Shuman's target population, which includes the walking wounded as well as
those suffering from major mental illness, is more analogous to the physi-
cally ill for whom an objective standard is used, rather than the physically
challenged for whom a subjective standard is used.80
Additionally, mentally disordered persons are far more likely to be in-
volved in tort litigation as defendants than are physically challenged persons.
For example, two-thirds of all tort claims for nonfatal personal injuries in-
volve motor vehicle accidents.8 1 Blind people do not drive automobiles, 82
but people with mental or emotional problems often do. Innocent plaintiffs
78. Some writers have urged adoption of an explicit double standard: Physically chal-
lenged people and children should be judged by the objective test when they are defendants
and by the subjective test when they are plaintiffs. Using a relaxed standard for plaintiffs
would enable them to avoid being found contributorily negligent and increase their opportu-
nity to obtain full compensation for their injuries. Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson,
Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 786-89 (1950). Courts, how-
ever, did not adopt the double standard proposal even in jurisdictions that applied the doctrine
of contributory negligence. See, e.g., Faith v. Massengill, 121 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Ga. Ct. App.
1961) (expressly applying the same standard to determine a child's negligence and contribu-
tory negligence); John S. Irvin, Note, Torts-Negligence-The Standard of Care for Children:
A Possible Negligence-Contributory Negligence Double Standard, 38 OR. L. REV. 268, 275
(1959) (asserting that the double standard proposal has not been supported by case law).
With the widespread adoption of comparative negligence, the proposal is even less supportable.
Contributorily negligent plaintiffs are able to recover for that portion of their injuries attributa-
ble to the defendants' negligence.
79. Although the language of § 283C applies a subjective standard of care to physical
illness as well as to physical disability, every case cited as authority for the physical illness
category involved heart attack, stroke, epileptic seizure, fainting spell or other loss of con-
sciousness that was sudden, unforeseeable, and totally incapacitating. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 283C app. (1966). See, e.g., Moore v. Capital Transit Co., 226 F.2d 57
(D.C. Cir. 1955) (convulsive seizure), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 966 (1956); Moore v. Presnell, 379
A.2d 1246 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (sudden, unforeseeable loss of consciousness); Weldon
Tool Co. v. Kelley, 76 N.E.2d 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (sudden heart pains); Keller v. Wonn,
87 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1955) (massive cerebral hemorrhage). Arguably, these examples could
be classified as unavoidable accidents.
80. After carefully analyzing the analogies of physically disabled persons and children to
mentally disordered persons, one writer concluded: "[N]either of the analogies is so perfect
that it is self-evident that manifest injustice is done when courts refuse to apply a subjective
standard to mentally handicapped adults." Ellis, supra note 8, at 1106.
81. HENSLER, supra note 71, at 110.
82. Partially sighted and other physically challenged individuals may drive automobiles
and engage in other activities that subject them to tort liability. Typically, however, the extent
and permanence of their disability is known before they engage in the activity, and society may
obligate them to undertake precautionary measures to minimize the increased risk. Requiring
a physically challenged person to obtain a driver's license assures that with precautions in
place, the person is capable of meeting minimally acceptable standards of driving. Children
who drive automobiles or who engage in other adult activities are held to the objective stan-
dard of the reasonable adult. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A cmt. c (1965).
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who have been subjected to an unreasonable risk of harm from the activities
of mentally disordered defendants have a legitimate claim for compensation.
C. THE PROPOSAL'S DETERRENT EFFECT IS UNPROVEN
AND UNNECESSARY
Tort law assumes that people are aware of potential tort sanctions and
alter their behavior to avoid them.8 3 Shuman admits, however, that tort
law's ability to deter unsafe conduct is problematic. 84 Reporting on exten-
sive research,8 5 Shuman recently concluded that none of the mainstream
psychiatric and psychological theories of human behavior 6 supports the de-
terrence theory of tort law.8 7 Indeed, the claim of tort law's deterrent effect
rests on society's intuitive belief that a person's behavior is influenced by
potential tort liability. 88. Without empirical verification of the deterrence
claim, however, courts should be reluctant to adopt a proposal that sacrifices
the compensation objective.
Shuman asserts that if tort law does operate as an incentive for appropri-
ate behavior, people with mental or emotional problems will not be en-
couraged to seek treatment if an objective standard of care is applied to them
regardless of whether they initiate treatment prior to the injury-producing
conduct. 89 Shuman favors the promise of a subjective standard as a neces-
sary inducement for treatment. He presents an example of a defendant who
initiates treatment, complies fully with the prescribed treatment regime but
who experiences reduced concentration or responsiveness while driving be-
cause he or she is preoccupied with problems raised during psychotherapy.90
In judging that person's tort liability, Shuman rejects use of an objective
standard that gives the defendant no extra credit for a responsible decision to
seek treatment.9' From Shuman's perspective, a subjective standard should
be used because successful treatment will ultimately reduce the risk of injury
from defendants who have sought treatment.
Tort law, however, acts much more directly. If deterrence works, it works
by imposing tort liability on defendants who engage in unsafe behavior. As
applied to Shuman's driving example, the conduct that society wishes to en-
courage is safe driving, not treatment of a mental or emotional problem that
83. Shuman, supra note 43, at 411.
84. Id. at 410.
85. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 KAN. L. REV. 115,
140-64 (1993).
86. Shuman grouped the mainstream theories into organic, biological, psychodynamic,
behavioral, and cognitive schools. Id. at 140.
87. Id. at 167. Shuman noted that the deterrence goal of tort law could be achieved if the
tort system were modified using the social learning theory model of human behavior. The
modification would require that more meritorious claims of tortious behavior be brought to
increase the likelihood that inappropriate behavior is perceived to be punished. Because of
society's desire to reduce, not increase, civil litigation, Shuman opined that an attempt to con-
form the tort system to social learning theory is not likely to succeed. Id. at 165.
88. Shuman, supra note 43, at 411.
89. Id. at 424.




may result in safe driving in the uncertain future. If people are rational
enough to seek treatment for their mental problems prior to engaging in
dangerous activities, they should be rational enough not to engage in those
activities if the treatment they receive exposes potential plaintiffs to unrea-
sonable risks of harm through reduced concentration or responsiveness.
The subjective standard inducement may not even achieve the treatment
goal. Just as most people do not calculate their potential tort liability before
they act, most people with mental and emotional problems will not choose to
obtain treatment relying on the knowledge that they will only be held to a
subjective standard if they injure another person while undergoing treat-
ment. People just don't act that way. They will seek treatment if they be-
lieve it will benefit them by reducing some disturbing symptoms such as
depression or anxiety. That is why people seek treatment, not because of a
promise of a relaxed standard of care that may reduce their tort liability.
D. THE PROPOSAL'S CONSEQUENCES ARE
POTENTIALLY ANTITHERAPEUTIC
People who believe they are free and responsible for their actions behave
differently from people who believe that they lack choice and responsibil-
ity.92 According to attribution theory, people are less likely to strive for
success when they attribute success or failure to outside forces that they are
powerless to control. 93 If people are able to avoid tort liability by "blaming"
their mental or emotional problems for their substandard conduct, they will
behave less responsibly. 94 Thus, by requiring them to conform to the objec-
tive standard of conduct applicable to others, the law compels responsible
behavior and refuses to reinforce feelings of learned helplessness. 95 In this
way, the objective standard is therapeutically beneficial.
Shuman, however, rejects this argument for those individuals who have
initiated treatment for their mental or emotional condition. He notes that a
person's willingness to undergo treatment "is not merely a necessary but also
a sufficient condition of efficacious treatment."'96 For this reason, Shuman
asserts that a refusal to factor treatment efforts into the standard of care
cannot be justified.97
Shuman's reasoning is not persuasive. Admittedly, no magic pill exists for
the quick and effective treatment of mental problems. Treatment that may
reduce the risk of injury in the long term may not reduce it, and may even
92. John Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719,
721-23 (1973) (discussing empirical research on human behavior).
93. Harold H. Kelley & John L. Michela, Attribution Theory and Research, 31 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 457, 480-89 (1980) (discussing consequences of attributions).
94. Similarly, by failing to assign personal responsibility for criminal conduct, successful
insanity defenses may hinder treatment of insanity acquittees. To the extent acquittees believe
their crimes were caused by their illnesses, they will be less inclined to undergo a treatment
process designed to change their thoughts and actions. Robert A. Fein, How the Insanity
Acquittal Retards Treatment, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 291 (1984).





increase it, in the short term. But precisely because treatment is not immedi-
ately effective, a person with a mental or emotional problem should weigh
the risks of engaging in dangerous activities while undergoing the treatment
process. Using a subjective standard of care to enable a mentally disturbed
defendant to avoid tort liability reinforces the message that a decision to seek
treatment is all that society requires of the individual. In essence, reliance
on the uncertainties of the treatment process replaces reliance on the mental
or emotional condition itself as an excuse for irresponsible behavior. Help-
lessness is learned, but from a new source.
Additionally, one can question Shuman's assumption that effective treat-
ment pursued to its logical conclusion will ultimately reduce the risk of in-
jury. Some forms of effective treatment have antitherapeutic consequences
that increase the potential for danger even while reducing or eliminating the
patient's symptoms. For example, psychotropic medications are the treat-
ment of choice for schizophrenic and affective disorders.98 Many patients
receive long-term treatment with these medications and experience impaired
memory, reasoning ability, and learning capacity on a continuing basis. 99
Before rushing to embrace a state of therapeutic grace, these deleterious con-
sequences must be fully considered-both by individuals in deciding whether
to accept treatment, and by society in deciding whether to encourage
treatment.
Use of a subjective standard has other antitherapeutic consequences for
people with mental or emotional problems. By refusing to hold them ac-
countable as ordinary persons, society denies their status as full-fledged
human beings.'10 Their immunity from tort liability compels others to shun
them, increasing their isolation. '0 ' Pressure to institutionalize them, or rein-
stitutionalize them, is inevitable. 10 2 In contrast, an objective standard is
consistent with current mental haalth treatment policy that encourages vol-
untary treatment efforts in the community setting. 103
98. Id. at 423.
99. Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Current State of the
Law and Beyond, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 7, 11 (David Rap-
oport & John Parry, eds., 1986).
The temporary and permanent adverse affects of medication have been proven in numerous
studies and attested to by courts and commentators. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp.
1342, 1359-60 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated
sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1137-38
(D.N.J. 1978); Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987);
Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 297-310 (1992) (discussing research on side effects).
100. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 9, at 35; Splane, supra note 9, at 167.
101. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 9, at 36.
102. Id. at 38. "If a person deemed civilly irresponsible is at large, surely he cannot be
allowed to continue to commit torts without compensating his victims. A person enjoying the
liberties of a sane citizen, but licensed at law to commit tortious acts with impunity, is unthink-
able." Id.
The antitherapeutic effects of institutionalization include stigma, dependency, isolation, and
degeneration. See Splane, supra note 9, at 161-62, for discussion and sources.
103. Splane, supra note 9, at 160-69. "The objective standard helps minimize the burden
on the community from deinstitutionalization, helps foster community acceptance of the men-
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Tort law attempts to strike a balance between a plaintiff's claim to protec-
tion against injury and a defendant's claim to freedom of action. 104 Thus, in
considering whether a subjective standard is therapeutic or antitherapeutic,
its effects on the plaintiff must be considered as well as its effects on the
defendant. Specifically, does a court judgment imposing tort liability on the
defendant have a beneficial restorative effect on the plaintiff? In a recent
article, Shuman examined behavioral research on this issue and concluded
that it did.105 In fact, victims are most satisfied when they receive compen-
sation from the person who injured them rather than from a third party. 106
Shuman opined that "the psychological primacy of compensation may not
be adequately addressed by sterile payments to an injured person from a
third party lacking responsibility for causing the harm to the plaintiff."',0 7
Obviously, tort law's potential restorative effect is completely lost if, in a
fault-based system, a mentally disturbed defendant is absolved from all re-
sponsibility. The injured plaintiff recovers from no one.
E. THE PROPOSAL IS OVERINCLUSIVE
If Shuman's subjective standard proposal were limited exclusively to those
who suffer from major mental illnesses, the proposal would differ little from
earlier proposals.' 08 However, because any person's concentration and re-
sponsiveness may be profoundly impacted by the death of a loved one, the
loss of a job, the experience of obtaining a legal education, 10 9 or other tran-
sient situational stress, Shuman expands the subjective standard shield to
include the walking wounded as well. I I0
Such expansion is clearly unwarranted. Shuman cites research finding
that 14% of the population, that is, thirty-five million Americans, suffer
from a mental disorder."' More recent research, based on structured psy-
chiatric interviews with 8,098 men and women who were selected to be rep-
resentative of the entire population, revealed that 48% had experienced a
mental disorder during their lifetimes, and that 29.5% had experienced a
mental disorder within the twelve months preceding the interview." I 2 Extra-
tally ill, and encourages the mentally ill to become self-sufficient, responsible members of the
community." Id, at 163-64.
104. KEETON, supra note 5, at 6.
105. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law 62 (January 10,
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
106. Andre deCarufel, Victims' Satisfaction with Compensation: Effects of Initial Disadvan-
tage and Third Party Intervention, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 445, 452 (1981).
107. Shuman, supra note 105, at 22.
108. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
109. Shuman, supra note 43, at 417 (discussing reports that 32% of students were de-
pressed by the end of their first year of law school and that 40% were depressed by the third
year).
110. Id. at 414-15.
111. Id. at 413 (discussing Laura A. Cushman et al., Psychiatric Disorders and Motor Vehi-
cle Accidents, 67 PSYCHOL. REP. 483, 486-87 (1990)).
112. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime and 12-Month Prevalence of DSM-III-R Psychiatric
Disorders in the United States: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey, 51 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 8, 12 (1994). Data was gathered on the prevalence of 14 DSM-III-R psychiatric
disorders. The most common were major depressive episode (17.1% lifetime, 10.3% within
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polating these percentages to the entire population suggests that 120 million
Americans experience a mental disorder during their lifetimes and that sev-
enty-five million experience a mental disorder within any twelve-month pe-
riod. Obviously, a proposal that may extend the subjective standard to
persons experiencing a mental disorder, or even more broadly to persons
under stress, has enormous implications for the determination of tort
liability.
In the landmark case of Vaughan v. Menlove, 113 the court weighed the
merits of the objective and subjective standards. Chief Justice Tindal ex-
plained that the subjective standard was rejected because liability determined
by the good faith judgment of the defendant "would be as variable as the
length of the foot of each individual."' 14 In fact, because most defendants
do make good faith judgments, one commentator even suggested that a sub-
jective standard "would tend to produce nearly universal immunity from
liability."' 15 In contrast, by requiring the individual to conform to the ob-
jective, reasonable person standard, a community level of safety can be uni-
formly maintained.16
As previously discussed, the less demanding subjective standard has sup-
planted the objective standard for physically challenged individuals and chil-
dren. The law recognizes that they are incapable of conforming to the
objective standard and thus are not at fault when they fail to do so.1 7 Can a
similar dispensation be claimed by persons with mental or emotional
problems? An affirmative response can only be given if their otherwise tor-
tious behavior was caused by the mental condition and not by free choice.118
A finding that a defendant is mentally disordered does not, in and of itself,
justify a further finding that the defendant's behavior was uncontrollably
caused by the mental disorder, or even that the behavior was related to the
mental disorder. 1 9 After reviewing clinical observations of mentally disor-
dered people, empirical research comparing mentally disordered and non-
last 12 months), alcohol dependence (14.1% lifetime, 7.2% within last 12 months), social pho-
bias (13.3% lifetime, 7.9% within last 12 months), and simple phobias (11.3% lifetime, 8.8%
within last 12 months). Id. Of those persons with a history of at least one mental disorder,
56% had two or more. Id. at 17.
113. 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
114. Id. at 493. Determining liability by considering whether the defendant acted honestly
and to the best of his or her own judgment "would leave so vague a line as to afford no rule at
all, the degree of judgment belonging to each individual being infinitely various." Id.
115. Seidelson, supra note 8, at 19.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965).
117. See supra notes 33-34, 75-82 and accompanying text.
118. Seidelson asserted that a subjective standard is warranted only when a litigant's "sub-
jective characteristic makes it uniquely difficult for the litigant to comply with the reasonable
person standard, and if judicial cognizance of that characteristic does not frustrate the other
litigant's reasonable expectations." Seidelson, supra note 8, at 20.
119. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 581 (1978) [hereinafter Morse I]; see also Stephen J. Morse,
Treating Crazy People Less Specially, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 353, 353 (1987) [hereinafter Morse
II]: "[S]pecial legal treatment results from the assumption that crazy people are not responsi-
ble for their behavior, an assumption buttressed by the mistaken and usually unanalyzed no-
tion that mental disorder per se deprives people of responsibility." Id.
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mentally disordered people, and empirical research bearing directly on the
rationality and normality of mentally disordered people, 120 Morse concluded
that the behavioral differences between mentally disordered and non-
mentally disordered people are less pronounced than is usually supposed. 12 1
In fact, considerable evidence suggests that mentally disordered people "are
capable of behaving normally and rationally." 122 Especially relevant are
studies of the behavior of mentally disordered people in real world contexts,
such as driving cars, holding jobs, or managing finances. Mentally disor-
dered people were found to be better able to perform these tasks than is
usually assumed, "and their behavior is often indistinguishable from the be-
havior of normal people."' 123 Morse found that, at most, mental disorder
slightly predisposes a person to socially unacceptable behavior, but that such
behavior is rarely, if ever, irresistible. 12
4
In his article, Shuman acknowledges the questionable linkage between
mental disorder and conduct that produces accidental injury. 125 Despite
this acknowledgement, Shuman does not restrict his subjective test proposal
to that small group whose mental disorders render them incapable of con-
trolling their injurious conduct. Incredibly, Shuman concludes that to maxi-
mize the therapeutic potential of tort law, the subjective standard should be
extended to the walking wounded. 126 Although Shuman correctly observes
that stress may affect our concentration and responsiveness, he does not
prove that people under stress are incapable of adhering to the objective
standard of the reasonable person. Although we may wish to encourage
people under stress to obtain treatment, absent such proof we should be un-
willing to reward them for getting treatment by using a subjective standard
of care to measure their tort liability.
To narrow the target population qualifying for the subjective standard,
120. Morse II, supra note 119, at 362.
121. Id. at 366.
122. Morse I, supra note 119, at 576. Morse concluded: "Most people with mental disor-
ders, even severe ones, are not different enough from normal persons to warrant special treat-
ment, and there is little scientific reason to believe that they cannot control themselves." Id. at
653.
123. Morse II, supra note 119, at 369.
124. Morse I, supra note 119, at 571. Some recent research suggests that mental disorder
may be related to violent behavior. The increased risk of violence, however, was found only
among those mentally disordered persons who were currently experiencing psychotic symp-
toms. Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Reconsidered,
57 Am. Soc. REV. 275 (1992); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in
the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HosP. & COM-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761, 761 (1990). The elevated risk of violence for actively psychotic
individuals has been characterized as "modest" and makes only a "trivial contribution" to the
total violence in our society. Link, supra, at 290.
125. Shuman, supra note 43, at 413. In another article, Shuman noted that the relationship
between the organic abnormality of epilepsy and automobile accidents is not as direct as might
be thought. Although drivers with epilepsy have an increased risk of automobile accidents,
studies show that only 11% of the accidents in which they are involved are attributable to
seizures. The major cause of automobile accidents both for epileptics and the general popula-
tion is driver error. Shuman, supra note 85, at 142 (discussing Allan Krumholz et al., Driving
and Epilepsy: A Review and Reappraisal, 265 JAMA 622, 622 (1991)).
126. Shuman, supra note 43, at 414.
1994] 1855
SMU LAW REVIEW
Shuman imposes treatment obligations. As formulated, however, those obli-
gations generate more questions than answers. For example, Shuman would
limit the subjective standard to those defendants who initiated treatment
prior to their injury-producing conduct. 127 One may question whether this
treatment requirement effectively narrows the target population. The recent
massive study on the prevalence of mental disorder revealed that profes-
sional treatment was obtained by 42% of those who experienced a mental
disorder during their lifetimes and 20.9% of those who experienced a mental
disorder within the preceding twelve months. 128 Extrapolating these per-
centages to the entire population suggests that fifty million people would
meet the treatment requirement during their lifetimes and fifteen million
would do so within a twelve-month period. These large numbers reflecting
the prevalence of treatment exist without any subjective tort standard in-
ducement. How much larger will these numbers become if Shuman's propo-
sal is adopted and achieves its therapeutic objective?
Additionally, would the initiation-of-treatment requirement be used inap-
propriately to exclude mentally disordered people who have been released
from involuntary hospitalization on condition that they continue to take
post-confinement medications? Should they be denied a subjective test be-
cause they did not volunteer for treatment originally? Perhaps compliance
with the treatment regimen should be sufficient without an initiation-of-
treatment requirement.
For the subjective standard to be applicable, Shuman requires full compli-
ance with the treatment regime. 129 If a patient sometimes forgets to take his
or her medication, as we all do on occasion, or if a patient infrequently
cancels an appointment with a therapist, is he or she forever branded with an
objective standard? If not, then how do we measure the requirement of full
compliance? In answering that question, must we consider the significance
of that missed medication or canceled appointment on the subsequent acci-
dent-producing behavior or is noncompliance with treatment determinative
without reference to its causative effect?
Shuman also wrestles with the problem of treatment unavailability.1 30
Apparently, he would extend the subjective standard to indigent people who
made a good faith effort to obtain treatment that is financially unavailable.
He admits, however, that difficulty is likely to be encountered in docu-
menting efforts to obtain treatment and to assess financial incapacity. 13 1
Should the subjective standard be extended to people living in rural areas for
whom treatment is unavailable? How much inconvenience must one endure
in making a good faith effort to obtain treatment? Most importantly, what if
treatment is unavailable because the person's mental disorder is untreatable?
Should that person be excluded because we can not use the tort law incentive
127. Id. at 426.
128. Kessler, supra note 112, at 14.
129. Shuman, supra note 43, at 426.




to encourage that person to obtain treatment that is nonexistent? If so, how
can we justify a distinction between the untreatable and the indigent or the
rural dweller?
Finally, Shuman limits use of the subjective standard to situations in
which the defendant, prior to the injury-producing conduct, initiated a treat-
ment that has "been proven effective through rigorous scientific studies."' 132
Although Shuman's purpose is to eliminate fringe treatments from consider-
ation, he provides no definition of efficacious treatment. In fact, earlier in
his article, Shuman notes that although psychotherapy is considered to be
effective for the treatment of nonpsychotic depression and moderate anxie-
ties, no consensus exists about psychotherapy's efficacy for other mental or
emotional problems. 133 Would he exclude even this mainstream psychiatric
treatment unless the initiating patient suffered from depression or anxiety?
To prevent unwarranted use of the subjective standard by people with no
mental problems, Shuman requires an evaluation by a mental health profes-
sional. 134 But such an evaluation is not likely to be an effective barrier.
Mental health professionals are trained to make diagnoses. If a person initi-
ates treatment, complaining of sleeplessness, anxiety, depression, or any
other symptom, some diagnosis is likely to be made and some treatment
prescribed. The diagnosis of unspecified mental disorder (nonpsychotic) is
made when enough information has been provided to rule out a psychotic
disorder but not enough information is available to make another
diagnosis. 135
In deciding what constitutes an effective treatment, should one consider
the qualifications of the therapist? Should distinctions be drawn between
various mental health professionals-for example, should therapy by social
workers or marriage, family, and child counsellors serve to reduce the stan-
dard of care? Should a distinction be drawn between all mental health pro-
fessionals and priests or other lay-counsellors? For example, if a person
suffered depression because of the untimely death of a loved one, should that
individual be denied the subjective standard for choosing to interact with a
lay-support group rather than a psychologist? Should someone with a signif-
icant drinking problem be denied the subjective standard for regularly at-
tending meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous instead of seeing a psychiatrist?
What if a psychiatrist or psychologist recommended these lay-support
groups at an initial diagnostic session? Have these treatments been proven
effective through rigorous scientific studies?
The argument for a subjective standard is weakened by a requirement that
treatment effectiveness be proven. If a particular treatment has undergone
rigorous scientific studies, then in addition to knowing whether that treat-
ment is effective, we should also know the limitations of and the dangers
inherent in that treatment. For example, before prescribing psychotropic
132. Id.
133. Id. at 422.
134. Id. at 429.
135. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 2, at 687.
1994] 1857
SMU LAW REVIEW
medication, the psychiatrist considers not only its potential effectiveness, but
its potential side effects such as drowsiness or decreased cognitive function.
If the psychiatrist knows that the patient will drive an automobile and then
prescribes the medication without informing the patient of these risks, the
psychiatrist can be held liable for injuries caused by these side effects. If the
psychiatrist informs the patient of these potentially dangerous side effects
and the patient with such knowledge decides to drive the automobile any-
way, the patient should be held liable for injuries that are produced by the
side effects. The patient's duty to exercise reasonable care should not be
diminished.
III. TOWARD A REASONABLE SOLUTION
Shuman's attempt to encourage mental health treatment is likely to be
endorsed by mental health professionals. After all, it offers them full em-
ployment. Almost everyone would benefit from treatment for the stress of
everyday living. If a person seeks treatment, under Shuman's proposal he or
she is eligible for the subjective standard of care.136 The proposal is far too
expansive to be acceptable. Other, more narrowly crafted, proposals that
apply the subjective standard to people with diagnosable mental disorders
should also be rejected. 137 Injurious behavior has not been proven to be
uncontrollably caused by mental disorder. 138
But should an objective test be used in each and every case? I think not.
In The Common Law, Holmes defended the objective, reasonable person
standard. 139 In an often-quoted passage, 140 Holmes asserted that by sacrific-
ing consideration of individual peculiarities and minute differences of char-
acter,' 4' the objective standard assures that innocent plaintiffs will be
protected against a socially unacceptable level of risky behavior. Holmes
cautioned, however, that use of the objective standard assumes that potential
defendants possess ordinary capacity to avoid harm. Thus, "[w]hen a man
has a distinct defect of such a nature that all can recognize it as making
certain precautions impossible, he will not be held answerable for not taking
them." 42 As examples, Holmes mentioned physically challenged individu-
als and children. Holmes then noted:
Insanity is a more difficult matter to deal with, and no general rule can
be laid down about it. There is no doubt that in many cases a man may
be insane, and yet perfectly capable of taking the precautions, and of
being influenced by the motives, which the circumstances demand. But
if insanity of a pronounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the
136. See supra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
137. See Curran, supra note 8, at 74 (discussing whether a subjective test should apply to
people with personality disorders).
138. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
139. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108-09.
140. KEETON, supra note 5, at 176. Shuman quotes Holmes's statement in full. Shuman,
supra note 43, at 418.
141. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108.
142. Id. at 109.
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sufferer from complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense
would require it to be admitted as an excuse. 143
With increased understanding of mental disorder, Holmes's solution may
be even more appropriate today than when he first suggested it over a hun-
dred years ago. Even Morse, who asserted that mentally disordered people
generally are capable of behaving rationally, 144 acknowledged that "[t]he
law should interfere and nullify the usual legal significance of a person's ac-
tions . .. if it is satisfied that the individual was incapable, for whatever
reason, of meeting the functional criteria for competence and full legal re-
sponsibility."' 45 As an example of incapacity, Morse cited a chronically dis-
abled, hallucinating, delusional person wandering the streets in rags and
speaking gibberish.' 46 Tort cases involving such people occur infrequently,
but when they do occur, they should be handled appropriately.
In 1970, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to apply the objective stan-
dard to every case involving a severely mentally disordered defendant. In
Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co.,1 47 the court held that if a defendant is
suddenly overcome without forewarning by a mental disorder that prevents
conformance to the reasonable person standard, the defendant will be ab-
solved from liability as if he or she had suffered a sudden incapacitating
physical injury such as an unexpected heart attack, epileptic seizure, stroke,
or fainting spell. 148 In essence, the defendant is relieved from liability be-
cause the sudden, incapacitating mental disorder is treated as an unavoidable
accident.
The Breunig court's willingness to absolve incapacitated mentally disor-
dered defendants from tort liability is commendable. However, the court's
attempt to distinguish sudden mental disorder from other mental disorder
has been strongly criticized. "49 Although sudden incapacitation seems an
appropriate requirement for cases involving physical disabilities, it is inap-
propriate for cases involving mental disabilities. Severely mentally disor-
dered individuals may be unable to control their behavior even though their
disorder was not of sudden onset. In such cases, fault cannot be found. To
paraphrase Holmes, if severe mental disorder has manifestly incapacitated a
defendant from complying with the reasonable person standard, the injury
was produced by an unavoidable accident, and the defendant should be ab-
solved from responsibility.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
145. Morse I, supra note 119, at 649. See also Ellis, supra note 8, at 1089: "But among
those cases in which causation is established, it is likely that the law would demand (as it does
in the criminal field) that the disability involved be of sufficient magnitude or of a particular
type to warrant exoneration from responsibility for torts."
146. Morse II, supra note 119, at 370.
147. 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970).
148. Id. at 624. In Breunig, however, the court affirmed a finding of liability, noting that
the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that the driver of an automobile had
sufficient warning or knowledge that hallucinations would occur and affect her driving. Id. at
625.
149. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 8, at 1101-02.
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Acceptance of Holmes's modest proposal will have little immediate im-
pact on tort liability of mentally disordered persons. Most will continue to
be judged by the objective reasonable person standard. But in those few
cases in which the disorder manifestly incapacitates the defendant from
complying with that standard, liability for negligence will not be imposed. 1 50
Attempts to broaden this narrow principle of nonliability should be resisted
absent proof that the person's mental disorder was casually linked to the
tortious behavior.
150. For intentional tort liability to be imposed on a mentally disordered defendant, the
defendant must act with an intent to bring about tortious consequences. "Intent" requires that
the defendant desires the consequences or knows that the consequences are substantially cer-
tain to result from his or her act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965).
This requirement provides protection against liability without fault in an intentional tort
context.
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